公共英语五级考试阅读文章精选1

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President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press, which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and Whit House still appeared divided, and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked “the courage” to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations, the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop.

In fact, Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a “bullet-proof agreement” that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress, the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years.

THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists, while disappointed that the deal was not closed, agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions, “we’re not there yet,” according to senior officials.

Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U.S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself, he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) and Emest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal.

The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners: Get more protection for the U. S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way, the Administration tried, but failed, to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch: Wall Street, Hollywood, and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on “cultural” restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing.

BIG JOB. Already, business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement, but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans, including Lott, say that “the time just isn’t right” for the deal. Translation: We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human, religious, and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party, such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, won’t help, either.

Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20, when Rubin lectured 19chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997, working together won’t be easy. And Republicans-with a wink-say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America. Though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb, and if Congress overdoes the criticism, he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the Whit House: This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling.

译文：

克林顿总统4月8日决定将中国国务院总理朱镕基未经中国加入世界贸易组织的协议包装在内，似乎是一个巨大的错误估计。总统接受了大部分媒体的谩骂，这些媒体气喘吁吁地报道说，一笔交易已经到了。内阁和惠特家仍然出现分歧，商界领袖被描绘为对失去的机会愤怒。朱镕基指责克林顿缺乏达成协议的“勇气”。当克林顿后来打电话给愤怒的朱镕基重申谈判的时候，这个姿态被广泛地描绘成一个触发器。

事实上，克林顿为了更好地加入世贸组织，做出了正确的决定。在达成最终协议之前，需要更多的马交易。而且，如果政府没有“商业游说人士可以向共和党国会热情地出售”的“防弹协议”的目标，那么整个过程最终会陷入可能损害与中国关系多年的党派喧嚣。

困难的部分。许多商业游说者虽然对交易没有结束感到失望，但同意还可以有更好的条件。美国财政部长罗伯特·鲁宾（Robert E. Rubin），国家经济委员会主任吉恩·斯佩林（Gene B. Sperling），商务部长威廉·戴利（William M. Daley）和最高贸易谈判代表沙里·巴尔舍夫斯基（Charlene Barshefsky）都向克林顿提出了建议：尽管中国人已经做出了大量的让步，那里呢，“据高级官员说。

就遗留问题与朱谈判可能是一件容易的事情。尽管克林顿本身可以表示美国批准中国加入世贸组织，但他需要国会授予北京永久最惠国待遇作为广泛贸易协定的一部分。而干预国会山的诱惑可能会被证明是过度的。朱镕基在参议院多数党领袖特伦特·洛特（R-Miss）宣布自己对中国加入世贸组织表示怀疑之前，几乎没有下台。参议员Jesse A. Helms（R-N.C。）和Emest F. Hollings（D-S. C.）承诺提出一项法案，要求国会批准任何交易。

这三个纺织品国家的南方人隐藏的信息：获得美国服装业的更多保护。为了平稳的道路，政府曾尝试过，但没有成功，让朱镕基在纺织业上脱颖而出。还留在了华尔街，好莱坞和底特律。朱拒绝开放大量有利可图的中国证券市场，坚持对美国电影和音乐进行“文化”限制。他还阻挠了让美国汽车制造商提供机队融资的努力。

大工作。商业游说者已经盖过国会山来预售任何最终的协议，但迄今为止他们所听到的并不令人鼓舞。包括洛特在内的共和党人说，这个交易的“时机不对”。翻译：我们决心使它看起来好像克林顿向中国投降一样，而忽视人权，宗教和劳工权利的侵犯;核武器技术的盗窃;并将导弹部件出售给美国的敌人。北京在民主党内的激烈批评者，如明尼苏达州的参议员保罗·韦尔斯通和密苏里州的众议院少数党领袖理查德·格普哈特也不会帮助。

4月20日，鲁宾向19位高管发表讲话，要求惩戒他们的共和党盟友，国会山游说工作将会变得多么艰难。由于企业和白宫仍然对1997年的快速贸易谈判立法失败负责，所以合作并不容易。共和党人眨眼睛说，他们最终将拥抱中国加入世贸组织，为美国企业家服务。虽然他们折磨克林顿不久，但是朱总是站不住脚，如果国会过分批评，他可能会被国内批评家强迫背叛。企业必须为共和党盟友和惠特之家做出如此重大的贡献：这个历史性的协议太重要了，不必担心会失去更多的党派争吵。

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